On 19 June 2007, Amex issued a Default Notice asserting a breach of the agreement requiring remedial action in accordance with section 87(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (“the Act”).  Mr Brandon did not make the minimum payment and so on 11 July 2007, Amex sent Mr Brandon a Notice of Cancellation.

Amex then issued proceedings and Amex applied for summary judgment.  For Amex to succeed, Mr Brandon must have no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue in accordance with CPR Part 24.2(a)(ii).

Before the District Judge, Mr Brandon argued that the default notice required payment within 14 calendar days from the date of this Default Notice, but no allowance was made for the fact that he would not receive this notice on the same day and so he was given less than 14 days before the agreement was cancelled.  Applying the usual Civil Procedure Rules on service the District Judge gave summary judgment for Amex regarding the default as de minimis (minimal) and something he was prepared to overlook. Subsequently, on appeal, the Judge held that as no enforcement action was taken within the 14 days, the argument was not relevant because Mr Brandon had not suffered “any prejudice at all by virtue of that technical breach…” At the appeal stage, Amex also sought to rely on the contractual agreement which entitled Amex to terminate as an alternative to the Default Notice.  The Judge considered that this argument had not “simply been sprung” on Mr Brandon as it had been flagged previously.

The Court of Appeal noted that Mr Brandon’s stance was devoid of merit, but it could not conclude that there was no real prospect of a successful defence.

• On the first issue of the validity of the Default Notice the court was of the view that Amex was not entitled to summary judgment.  Mr Brandon’s defence could not be dismissed “as being unreal”.
• As a matter of construction, the Court of Appeal could not accept that the 14 day period ran from service of the Default Notice as opposed to the date of the Default Notice. It could not be presumed that the Default Notice would have been served less than two days after being posted.
• As a matter of construction, the Default Notice had not or may not have allowed the minimum statutory period for Mr Brandon to remedy the breach and so the defect could not be overlooked as de minimis.
• As regards the arguments on contractual termination, the Court of Appeal considered whether it could rely on a clause in the agreement and proceed on the basis of non-default termination.  The court was in broad agreement that sections 76 and 98 did not apply to this agreement.  However, there had been no mention of this before the District Judge and the point was only mentioned in the skeleton argument before the Judge.  The Court of Appeal considered that this was too significant a change of case and therefore it would not be fair to permit summary judgment on the basis of contractual determination without proper arguments.

Accordingly, Amex was not entitled to summary judgment and this matter would proceed to trial.  As the Court of Appeal noted “regardless of the outcome of the appeal, Mr Brandon is a bad credit risk; for this conclusion, he has only himself to blame.”

Ian Karl Robert Brandon v American Express Services Europe Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1187

The Guidance, which should be referred to by all businesses engaged in the recovery of consumer credit debts (e.g. debt collectors, banks and law firms), sets out the standards that the OFT expects all parties engaging in the recovery of such debts to adhere to.

The Guidance is divided into the following chapters:

1. Introduction. This sets out how the ‘fitness test’ under section 25 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 applies to debt recovery activities;

2. Overarching principles of fair business practice. This sets out the FSA’s overarching principles of consumer protection and fair business practice that apply to all debt recovery activities. This chapter explains that businesses should treat debtors fairly, be transparent, exercise forbearance and consideration, and act proportionately. They should also establish and implement clear, effective and appropriate policies and procedures (especially for dealing with vulnerable debtors);

3. Unfair or improper business practices. This sets out the behaviours that the OFT considers to be unfair or improper business practices for the purposes of section 25(2A)(2) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (e.g. using Facebook or Twitter to contact debtors.) If these are engaged in, they may call into question a person’s fitness to retain, or be granted, a consumer credit licence;

4. Regulatory compliance and enforcement. This outlines the OFT’s approach to securing compliance and provides information on the regulatory options available to the OFT.

The OFT has said that it will shortly update its Irresponsible Lending Guidance to reflect this revised version of Debt Collection Guidance.

This case is an interesting example of the type of claims a borrower with PPI can attempt to raise and the court’s approach to these claims. Borrowers are notorious for making numerous claims in relation to PPI, some of which may have substance, but the majority of which are, as the court here pointed out, “unnecessary embellishments”.  

This was an application by the claimants Mr and Mrs Barnes to re-amend their Particulars of Claim.  The claim related to PPI policies sold in relation to three different loans made by the defendant Black Horse Limited (“Black Horse”) to Mr and Mrs Barnes.  The first loan was made on 31 July 2002 for £2,000 with the PPI premium of £563.  This first loan was rolled up and discharged by the second loan made on 27 October 2003 for a further £4,500 and PPI of £2,021.48.  This in turn was then rolled up and discharged by a further written agreement dated 8 June 2004 for a further PPI policy of £2,694.48. Monies were still owing in respect of the third loan. 

Mr and Mrs Barnes wished to amend their Particulars of Claim to claim:

• Breach of Fiduciary Duty;
• Duty of Care;
• Breach of Contract;
• Unenforceability; and
• Unfair Relationship. 

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

As the court noted, it is exceptional for a creditor to have any fiduciary duty to the borrower at all.  The mere giving of advice does not itself import a fiduciary relationship and only exceptionally will the line be crossed from that of mere honesty care and skill and the like to a fiduciary obligation such that the adviser is held to be acting in the other party’s interests in terms of advice, information and so on. 

In order to establish a fiduciary duty, Mr and Mrs Barnes relied on the voluntary private customer code produced by the General Insurance Standards Council (the GISC) as evidence of the fiduciary relationship.  The GISC was abolished in 2004 and was replaced by ICOB, a FSA regulated scheme. 

Judge Waksman explained that the notion that you could infer a fiduciary relationship between the lender and the customer taking out a loan with PPI simply because the lender (or the insurers for whom it acted as agent in offering the policy) was a member of the GISC was absurd.

Mr and Mrs Barnes also relied on the OFT non-status lending guidelines for lenders and brokers.  These were guidelines which were specifically said to be operable where there is secured lending to non-status customers.  Mr and Mrs Barnes were not non-status nor was it secured lending.  Although the guidelines contained guidance in relation to all aspects of their business activity, none of this was sufficient to support a fiduciary obligation. 

Mr and Mrs Barnes also placed considerable reliance on the judicial review proceedings British Bankers Association v FSA, but again that did not assist a breach of fiduciary relationship.  The Judge found as a matter of law that there was no fiduciary relationship and explained that, in any event, he would have found it surprising for there to be a fiduciary relationship as it would have meant that every time a lender sold a single product PPI policy to accompany a loan agreement then without more (assuming the insurer was a member of GISC) fiduciary obligations would arise. 

Duty of care

The whole thrust of the Barnes case was that on the first occasion Black Horse sold the PPI insurance they said that in effect that the purchase of the PPI was mandatory and that this was then implicit on the second and third occasions. However, the court found there was no factual basis for pleading a duty of care.  It was not suggested that Black Horse had assumed a responsibility here to give particular advice on the facts of the case nor was it suggested that Black Horse was either asked to or was expected to or purported to give advice of any kind and therefore there was no arguable case presently pleaded in negligence.

Breach of contract

Mr and Mrs Barnes also claimed that the code produced by the GISC was incorporated into the loan agreement.  They alleged that by reason S75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (“the Act”),  the creditor would be jointly and severally liable for any breach of contract.  However, there was no incorporation of the code and therefore any claim for breach of contract based upon it fell away.

Unenforceability

Mr and Mrs Barnes alleged that when the first PPI was taken out they were told that it was “needed”. If that statement was made, it is arguable that taking the PPI policy was a condition of taking the principal loan and if so, the premiums should have comprised part of the total charge for credit.  As this was not done in the first agreement then it would be improperly executed.

As there were issues of fact and inferences this would be matters for a trial to consider. Full particulars of the factual allegation in relation to what exactly was said on the occasion of the first agreement and what was said and/or understood in relation to the second and third agreements about the necessity or otherwise of the PPI policy must be given and also as to how precisely the claim that there has been a failure to state the credit should be provided. Accordingly this claim could be made.

Unfair relationship

Under Section 140A of the Act the court can make an order in relation to the credit agreement if there is an unfair relationship between the creditor and borrower. Black Horse contended that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for unfair relationship because the relevant statutory provisions exclude the ability to make such a claim where one or both of the borrowers had the opportunity to make that claim in the context of prior proceedings.  The court found that Mr Barnes was not able to mount his own unfair relationship claim because this could have been raised by him in previous proceedings between Black Horse and Mr Barnes, but Mrs Barnes could raise this argument since she was not a party to those prior proceedings.

Black Horse also attempted to argue that the court was excluded from considering the two earlier agreements as they ceased to operate before 6 April 2007 when the relevant statutory provisions came into force.  The Judge disagreed with Black Horse and said that the court was entitled to take into account two earlier completed, but related agreements and therefore the Particulars of Claim could be amended to refer to the first and second agreements.

The court also looked at the factual matters raised to support the claim of unfair relationship. Their complaint was that:

a.  They were sold benefits when they already had such benefit;

b.  The policies were very expensive;

c.  Black Horse did not advise them to shop around for PPI policies;

d.  They were told the policies were compulsory when they were not;

e.  Black Horse did not establish that the policies were in their interests; and

f.  Black Horse failed to follow the terms of certain documents.

The court pointed out that the unfair relationship jurisdiction is very wide and although there may be matters which were not sufficient to found a fiduciary relationship, they may be sufficient for an unfair relationship.  Accordingly the court was not prepared to rule out the claim in respect of point a. above.  The Barnes claimed that the policies were very expensive.  However, they never produced an appendix which they had indicated they would do and so no permission was granted at this stage to include this factual matter although permission may be granted in the future.

The Judge was prepared to allow the amendment in relation to the claim under point d.. As to points c. and f. the Judge stated that that these were not particularly strong allegations, but he allowed these claim to be made because the unfair relationship jurisdiction is quite wide. He also allowed the claim to be made in relation to the documents.

 Conclusion

Despite Mr and Mrs Barnes’ attempts to raise numerous claims, the court concluded that the only viable claim was for an unfair relationship alongside the narrow unenforceability claim.  All the rest were “unnecessary embellishments”.  Even in respect of the claims that has been allowed to go forward, the court pointed out that this should not give the Barnes any particular encouragement in terms of their prospects of success.

Comment

This is a useful decision as it demonstrates that the “kitchen sink” approach of alleging numerous claims in an attempt to attack PPI cannot be sustained.  Where, however, an allegation is made that the borrowers were told that PPI was compulsory, the court will need to look at all the evidence and the circumstances of the case in order to evaluate this allegation.  It is clear that the scope of unfair relationship claims under section 140A of the Act can be wide although as the Judge hinted in this decision, this will not necessarily mean that the borrowers will ultimately succeed.

Shelley Barnes and Darren Barnes v Black Horse Limited [2011] EWHC 1416

Problems uncovered by the OFT’s investigation were specific to each business, as set out in the individual requirements.  However, across the sector the problems include:

• A failure to consider the customer’s circumstances or proportionality before asking the court to put a charging order in place;
• Not building adequate checks into the lender’s decision-making process; and
• Applying substantial charges for referring cases to a debt collection agency.

In a minority of cases, lenders sent oppressive and/or misleading correspondence.

The requirements imposed on some of the lenders included:

• providing a case file note seting out in reasonable detail why it was appropriate and reasonable to seek a charging order taking into account:
  • the extent to which a customer had responded to reasonable requests made by the lender;
  • such information about the personal and financial circumstances of the customer as the lender was able to obtain through its reasonable endeavours;
  • the amount of the sum owed;
  • the length of time that the sum has been owed;
  • whether it is reasonable for the lender to take steps other than those proposed.
• a requirement that the lender should consider whether the steps it proposed to take were proportionate having regard to the amount of the sum owed;
• a requirement that the lender should not state that it will seek a court order or judgment where the lender has no intention of seeking a court order or judgment;
• a requirement for new terms to be put in place where the lender wished to impose charges for default or impose charges to recover the costs of third parties and that any proposed new terms should be given to the OFT.

As part of the review of consumer credit and personal insolvency call for evidence, the Coalition is consulting on the impact of a £25,000 threshold before being able to enforce by means of a charging order and an order for sale.

Trading Standards Officers conducted onsite visits, a website sweep and a mystery shopping exercise.  They found that:

• Misleading advertising is the most significant area of non-compliance, in particular failing to disclose fees and misrepresenting debt management services as being free when they are not;
• Frontline advisers working for debt management companies are lacking in competence and are providing poor advice on inadequate information;
• There is low industry awareness of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) for resolving consumer complaints.

 The OFT plan to update their Debt Management Guidance and will carry out robust enforcement action against licensees that fail, or refuse, to change advertising and/or behaviour.

 Attached is a link to the detailed report http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/credit_licences/OFT1274.pdf and the Debt Management Guidance  http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/credit_licences/oft366.pdf.

The claimants alleged that the APR stated in the agreement should be regarded as the primary figure and the monthly interest rate should be calculated from and should correspond (as closely as possible) to the APR.  They produced an expert report from a mathematician and computer expert who concluded that the APR rates on the monthly cash advance balance rate were incorrectly stated.

A regulated agreement is not properly executed unless the agreement contains all the prescribed terms.  If improperly executed, it is only enforceable by an order of the court.  The court cannot grant such an order in respect of agreements signed before 6 April 2007 and so those agreements which did not contain all of the prescribed terms are irredeemably unenforceable.  The claimants alleged that the APR was misstated and as a consequence the agreements were unenforceable.

The Judge explained that there is a very clear difference between the nature and function of the stated monthly (or annual) rate and the APR. The stated monthly or annual rate is (on its face) a contractual term.  The APR is designed to provide information to consumers and is arrived at by a complex formula designed to include not only interest rates but also other charges.  The APR is not a prescribed term.  Merely because the APR is included does not make it a prescribed term of the agreement.  The APR is not the driver of the figures and in any event,  if it were,  it would be unworkable as the APR figure only needs to be stated at the inception of the agreement.

Accordingly the claims that the agreements were irredeemably unenforceable because of an alleged mismatch between the APR and the stated rate of interest were struck out.

This case involved calculating the interest rates retrospectively, which as the Judge pointed out had “a surreal quality to it”. In the light of the series of cases which have resulted in a positive outcome for lenders, this is yet another nail in the coffin for those who seek to use the courts to bring consumer credit related claims on a very tentative and speculative basis.

Sternlight v Barclays Bank Plc and others [2010] EWHC 1865

Please see the link for guidance.  The regulations come into force on 1 February 2011. 

The existing Consumer Credit Act regime is unchanged in relation to agreements secured on land and consumer hire agreements (although lenders may choose to comply with the new requirements in respect of agreements secured on land).

In summary, the regulations make amendments to the following:

•  The right to withdraw from the credit agreement and the requirement to provide adequate explanations.  Creditors are required to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness before granting credit or significantly increasing the amount of credit.  The borrower can withdraw from an agreement within 14 days following conclusion of the agreement or (if later) once the borrower has received a copy of the executed agreement or notification of the credit limit on a credit card.
• How to set out and calculate the total charge for credit and the annual percentage rate of charge (APR) in advertising and consumer information.
• What information to provide consumers before they enter into a credit agreement and the way in which that information must be provided. They largely replace regulations on the disclosure of pre-contractual information. The information must be clear and easily legible, and the borrower must be able to take it away to consider and to shop around if he wishes.
• What information must be included in a credit agreement and how it must be presented and the requirements on the signing of a credit agreement.
• What information must be included in advertisements for consumer credit agreements and how that information must be presented.  If an advertisement includes an interest rate or any amount relating to the cost of credit, it must also include a representative example.
• The borrower is entitled to seek redress from the creditor in certain circumstances if he is unable to obtain satisfaction from the supplier of goods or services.  This applies where s75 of the Consumer Credit Act is not applicable.

• How consumers enter into credit commitments, including the way in which credit is sold and the extent to which consumers understand what they are committing to;
• What issues arise during the lifetime of a loan from both the consumer and the lender perspectives; and
• What happens if things go wrong: are the current insolvency solutions fit for purpose?

A consultation on specific proposals is anticipated later this year or early 2011.

The appeal raised the question of what is the meaning of “credit”, the “amount of credit” and the “charge for credit” as defined in the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (“the Act”)?

SPPL charged a broker’s fee of £875, which was described in the credit agreement in box D as “Broker Administration Fee”.  Interest was payable on the fee at the same rate as the sum advanced under the loan, which was for £17,500.  On the credit agreement in box C, the amount of the Credit was stated to be £17,500 and in box E the “Total Amount Financed” was shown to be £18,375, which was £17,500 plus £875.

The borrowers submitted that because the total amount of the loan was £18,375, it was wrong to describe the amount of credit as only £17,500 as SPPL lent the borrowers the total sum of £18,375 and charged interest on that total. If that was accepted then the agreement would be wholly unenforceable under the Act.  The borrowers submissions were based on the principle of “truth in lending”.

In a fairly short judgment, the Supreme Court concluded that based on the language of the Act and following the previous authorities (in particular Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2001] QB 407), the fee of £875 was part of the total cost of, or charge for, credit and therefore could not be treated as part of the credit.  There was no infringement of the principle of truth in lending.

 As the court noted, if SPPL had described the broker’s fee as part of the credit, no doubt they would have raised the argument that the loan was unenforceable on the ground that the fee was part of the cost of the credit and should not be treated as part of the credit.  In order to succeed the borrowers would have needed to persuade the court that Wilson v First County was wrongly decided.

 This decision is obviously good news for lenders. If the borrowers had been successful, then lenders may have needed to reconsider their loan agreements.  It is yet another case (and this time at the highest level) which has gone against borrowers who raise technical arguments in order to avoid their obligations.

Southern Pacific 05-2 Plc (in substitution for Southern Pacific Personal Loans Limited) (Respondent) v Walker and another (Appellants)  [2010] UKSC 32

The key changes are as follows. 

• Adequate explanations.  A duty for lenders to provide adequate explanations to consumers about the credit on offer to enable them to decide whether it is suited to their needs and circumstances.  (Regulation 3 and 4 of the Directive).
• Assessment of creditworthiness.  An obligation for lenders to assess the creditworthiness of consumers before concluding a credit agreement or increasing the amount of credit available under an existing agreement.  Lenders can decide how to assess creditworthiness, but are required to base their assessment on information obtained from the consumer, where appropriate and from a credit reference agency, where this is necessary. (Regulation 5 of the Directive).
• Refusal of credit.  If an application is refused on the basis of information from a credit reference agency, the lender must inform the creditor of this when it declines the credit.  (Regulation 40 of the Directive).
• Right to withdraw.  The consumer has the right to withdraw from a credit agreement within 14 days without giving any reason.  This replaces the current more limited right to cancel some types of agreements in certain circumstances.  (Regulation 13 of the Directive).
• Assignments of debts.  If a debt is assigned, the consumer must be informed of this by either the lender who buys the debt or the lender who sold the debt.  (Regulation 36 of the Directive).
• Credit intermediary links.  Credit intermediaries must disclose their links to lenders and disclose and agree fees for their services with the consumer. (Regulation 41 of the Directive).
• Right to repay early.  The consumer has the right to repay an agreement early in part and to receive a reduction in the total cost of the agreement as a result.  The existing legal framework for full early repayment has been retained and extended to cover partial early repayment.  (Regulation 29-34, 59-62 and 77-84 of the Directive).
• Right to terminate.  The consumer has the right to terminate an open-end credit agreement at any time unless the parties have agreed that a period of notice not exceeding one month should be given.  The lender can also terminate subject to given the consumer at least two months’ written notice.  The lender can also terminate or suspend the consumer’s right to draw down an open-end credit agreement provided they give objectively justified reasons for doing so. (Regulation 37-38 of the Directive).

The Directive also amends or extends existing requirements:

• Advertisements.  Advertisements that contain specific information about the cost of the credit need to provide a representative example of a credit offer.  The Consumer Credit (Advertisement) Regulations 2010 will dispense with the typical APR approach.
• Pre-contractual information. Consumers must be given pre-contractual information in writing according to a specific format set out in the Directive. This information is set out in the Consumer Credit (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2010.
• Contractual information.  Other contractual information required is set out in the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulation 2010.
• Unsecured overdrafts.  Non-business unsecured overdrafts will be subject to the requirements for both pre-contractual and contractual information although an overdraft can be arranged urgently without prior written information.  Where a current account allows the account holder to overdraw without a pre-arranged overdraft, information about the charges must be included in the agreement. (Regulation 19 of the Directive).
• Obligation of the creditor in respect of goods.  Where a credit agreement is used to purchase goods, the consumer can pursue the creditor for a remedy. The value of the goods must be at least £30,000, the credit agreement must be for £60,260 or less and the consumer must have tried to obtain satisfaction from the supplier first.  This supplements s75 of the Consumer Credit Act where the cash price of goods is not less than £100 and not more than £30,000. (Regulation 25 of the Directive).
• The total charge for credit and the APR.  The total charge for credit and the APR must be calculated in accordance with a specified formula.  The formula is different to the one which already applies in the UK , but the result it produces is the same and the assumptions are broadly similar.  (Total Charge for Credit Regulations 2010).
• Variation of interest rate.  Where an agreement allows for variation of an interest rate,  notice of variation must be provided to the consumer before the change takes effect.  This is similar to the current requirements. 

Consumer Credit Litigation Solicitors (“CCLS”) were the solicitors for all the claimants. CCLS was the trading name for the sole practice of Mr Burley.  The claims management company was Cartel Client Review Limited (“CCR”).  Following on from the judgment, permission was given to  join Mr Burley trading as CCLS and CCR in respect of an application for a non-party costs order against them.  In addition, Mr Wright who was the sole shareholder and managing director of CCR was also joined to the application for a non-party costs order.

CCR conceded that it should be jointly and severally liable with the claimants for the costs.  The court decided that a costs order was justified against CCLS.  The solicitors failed to obtain after the event insurance (“ATE”) for its clients.  Not only did it fail to obtain ATE, but it failed to tell the clients and was effectively acting without instructions.  The overwhelming likelihood was that if CCLS had acted as it should have done these cases would not have been issued or progressed and the costs incurred by the lenders would not have been sustained. 

As for Mr Wright, the court decided not to make a non-party costs order against him. CCR was not itself the relevant claimant or defendant.  Although CCR as a claims management company would benefit in the event of success, there was nothing improper in that.  The claimants were genuine claimants who decided to make these claims.  CCR was not itself the relevant claimant or defendant.  The real causative factor on the issue of costs was the failure to obtain ATE, which was CCLS’s fault not CCR or Mr Wright.

Mohammed Adris and others v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and (1) Cartel Client Review Limited (2) Richard Burley trading as Consumer Credit Litigation Solicitors (3) Mr Carl Wright [2010] EWHC 941

When the claimants issued proceedings, the court had not ruled on Carey or McGuffick.  Nevertheless the court held that as with any claimant, they took the risk that the legal issues might be determined against them and as such this was no reason why the other party should pay their costs.  Accordingly all claims for a different costs order under CPR 38.6 were dismissed.

Anton Teasdale v HSBC Bank Plc and other related cases [2010] EWHC 612

 There are two questions in the consultation:

The draft guidance consists of a document setting out the technical legal issues for businesses and consumer advisers, and a simpler version for consumers.

The consultation is open until 21 April 2010.  The technical legal advice makes the following points:

•  Consumers have been given an exaggerated expectation of what the creditor or owner must do in order to comply with an information request as a result of misleading claims by claims management companies and inaccurate information on the internet.
• A number of creditors, appear not to understand their obligations under these sections.
• The purpose of these sections is to provide information to the consumer, not to provide a method for consumers to avoid paying their debts.
• The OFT considers that the creditor in sections 77 and 78 and the owner in section 79 includes a person who has merely bought the debts under the agreement. 
• As well as assignees ensuring that they are able to obtain from the assignor copies of the agreements and documents and historical information on the account, the original creditor should ensure that if necessary and appropriate, it is able to readily obtain from assignees any necessary information on the most recent state of the account.
• The creditor should satisfy itself that the writer of the request has the proper authority to obtain the information.  If there is no authority with the request the creditor is entitled to reply by asking to see the authority.
• If the request comes from only one debtor where there are two or more debtors, it must be complied with and the response given to both or all debtors.
• The creditor is not entitled to charge more than £1.
• The creditor can send the documents by ordinary second class post to the address given in the request.
• It is wise to retain some record of posting.
• If a claims management company does not hold a license then the OFT would expect the creditor to inform the debtor/hirer  why the information is being sent direct to him and to notify the OFT and Ministry of Justice.
• The request should be complied within 12 working days after the receipt is received.  The day the request is received is not included, but it will include the day the information is sent.
• A true copy as confirmed in the recent case of Carey v HSBC Bank plc does not mean an exact copy.
• There is no obligation to provide a signed copy.  The creditor may be able to provide evidence that its practice was always to require a signature to its agreements.
• The creditor can reconstitute a copy of the agreement.  The name and address at the time of execution must be included, but this can be taken from any source available.
• If the reason why no copy of the agreement is given to a request under these sections is that there never was an executed agreement, the creditor should acknowledge this in its response.
• Where there has been a variation, the duty is to provide the original agreement, but a copy of the latest variation or a clear statement of the terms of the agreement as varied.
• Any copy must be easily legible.
• The consultation provides details of the documents to be provided.
• The consultation also provides details of the statements of account that should be provided.
• The duty does not apply if the agreement has been paid off or terminated.
• It does not apply where judgment has been obtained unless there is an interest-after judgment clause in the agreement which the creditor or owner has not expressly waived.
• If the creditor fails to comply with the duty, it is not entitled, while the failure to comply continues, to enforce the agreement.
• If sections cannot be complied with, the debt does not disappear and it is perfectly acceptable for a creditor to seek to pursue the debt and to register any arrears or default with a credit reference agency.
• If a creditor were to threaten court action, knowing that such action is not possible, this would be misleading and oppressive.
• Where an agreement is unenforceable because of non-compliance with the sections:
• The OFT would expect the creditor to take steps to check that there was an agreement and that there are monies outstanding.
• No communications or requests should threaten court action or other enforcement of the debt where the creditor is aware that it cannot or will not be entitled to enforce the agreement.
• The creditor should make it clear in communications that the debt is unenforceable.  Failure to do so would unfairly mislead the debtor.
• Where a creditor has satisfied itself that a debt does exist and is correctly described, it is acting fairly in registering a default with credit reference agencies and informing the debtor or hirer that it intends to do so. 

 Judge David Waksman held that the banks could satisfy its duty sunder s78 by providing a reconstituted version of the executed agreement which may be from sources other than the actual signed agreement itself.

It is estimated that claims management companies have been looking at  thousands of cases in an attempt to exploit s78 of the Act.  S78 imposes an obligation on the bank to provide a copy of the executed agreement under a regulated agreement for running-account credit within 12 days after receiving a request in writing from the debtor and a payment of a fee of £1.

Sometimes the banks were unable to provide an exact copy of the agreement and these claims management companies sought to claim that the debts were not enforceable.  The Judge disagreed although held that the s78 copy must contain the name address of the debtor as it was at the time of the execution of the agreement.  The creditor can provide the name and address from whatever source it has of those details.  It does not have to take them from the executed agreement itself.  If an agreement has been varied by the creditor under a unilateral power of variation, the creditor must still provide a copy of the original agreement, as well as the varied terms.

The Judge also decided that a breach of s78 this does not of itself give rise to an unfair relationship within the meaning of section 140A of the Act thus defeating a significant number of claims.

 This decision is truly a triumph of common sense.  When introduced, the aim of the Act was to release the credit industry from outdated restrictions and allow it to develop a framework to encourage competition whilst at the same time providing consistent and adequate protection for consumers across the whole spectrum of credit transactions.  The attempts by the claims management companies to exploit the provisions of the Act achieved none of these goals.

 This decision is certainly good news for the banks and what with the failure of the OFT in the Supreme Court to challenge bank charges, 2010 will have a more optimistic start.

At the times the loans were made, they made good business sense for the defendant and so were legally binding agreements.  There was an imbalance in their relationship as the defendant looked up to the claimant because of his greater education and achievements.  To charge an interest rate almost three times greater than the base rate was completely out of line with the terms of the original loans and in the circumstances exorbitant.  

The court has a very wide discretion under section 140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and so reduced the sum payable by the defendant. 

This case provides a good example of when a court will intervene under the Consumer Credit Act 1974  to ensure that the terms of a loan agreement are fair.

Patel v Patel [2009] EWHC 3264 10 December 2009