The Court of Appeal has rejected an appeal against the decision of the High Court, on the grounds that the High Court’s findings were not based on any error of principle or perversity in factual findings, leaving no scope for a fresh evaluation by the Court of Appeal.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed a cross-appeal against the finding that the UK trade mark for the number 32 had not been infringed. The Court of Appeal ruled that the High Court had incorrectly assumed that, where a separate reputation had not been established by use of the trade mark, there could be no infringement under section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994; rather, the number 32 was a significant part of the trade marks that the High Court had ruled had been infringed, such that there was no basis for saying that the trade mark for the number 32 had not been infringed as well.

India and China both have an established and successful generics based pharmaceutical industry and as tens of billions of pounds of  patent protected drugs come off patent soon (known as the “patent cliff”), they look set to benefit by releasing cheaper generic  alternatives – making themselves a small fortune in the process. Both the Wall Street Journal and BBC News have reported on the most recent victim of the patent cliff in which India-based firm Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited confirmed the release of an FDA-approved generic version of the 10 billion dollar a year drug “Lipitor” owned by the global pharmaceutical company, Pfizer. The new generic drug will be called “Atorvastatin” and with Lipitor’s patent having now expired, there is nothing Pfizer can do about it – except try to develop itself or buy in the next big thing from another research and developer.

With such a Robin Hood approach to pharmaceuticals there are mixed opinions about the impact the patent cliff is having on the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. The large pharmaceutical companies claim that the patent cliff is affecting their ability to raise funds for research and development which in turn is inhibiting advances in new and improved pharmaceuticals, to the detriment of patients. The smaller generic based companies and some consumer groups however are hailing the patent cliff as an opportunity to offer a wider-ranging and affordable selection of medicines to both the public and private sectors.

Laura Mole, from Matthew Arnold and Baldwin LLP’s Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Sector Group Team, says, “Whilst I appreciate continued research and development in the pharmaceutical industry as a whole is vital for the production of new, more advanced drugs to combat human illness, I cannot help but see good quality, affordable alternative medicines as a good thing for the consumer and the NHS in these difficult financial times. More drugs will cost less so more patients will benefit. The important thing in the long-term, though, is that there is sufficient funding in the industry to incentivise continued research and development so that patients continue to benefit with further medical advances. More of the early-stage development is being done by start-up companies, with big pharma companies stepping in if the prospects look good.”

1. the meaning of a “communication to the public” for the purposes of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (the “Act”); and
2. the meaning of “reproduction in part” (whether individual frames amounted to a substantial part of the copyright work and whether the display of a broadcast on screen amounted to reproduction) for the purposes of the Act.

The High Court has now ruled that the first question should be amended for reference to the ECJ, as to whether the right to authorise or prohibit broadcasts extends to broadcasters of free-to-air programmes online to users who could lawfully receive those broadcasts on their televisions.

The High Court has also stated that the second question above has been answered by the ruling of the ECJ in the case of the FA Premier League v QC Leisure & Karen Murphy, which stated that copyright owners do have the “exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect” reproduction of their content in the form of “transient fragments of the works within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a television screen, provided that those fragments contain elements which are the expression of the authors’ own intellectual creation, and the unit composed of the fragments reproduced simultaneously must be examined in order to determine whether it contains such elements”.

BT’s initial response has been that it would need to be ordered by a court before taking action, in the same way that a court order was needed before Newzbin2 was blocked. Those downloading copyright content illegally may not be paying for the service they receive, but it is certainly costing the ISPs and industry bodies huge amounts in legal fees to try to prevent it.

BT estimated that the cost of implementing the court order was approximately £5,000, so it is unlikely that it would be worth the ISPs putting up a legal fight against any forthcoming court order. Indeed, the ISPs seem to have indicated that they would comply with any court order they receive. However, there is some doubt as to whether they have agreed to the width of the MPA’s requests for their consent to a court order. The move will only add fuel to the fire stoked up by critics of website blocking – the speed with which the pressure to block Newzbin2 has spread to other ISPs may also spread to other websites (such as The Pirate Bay) and lead to more argument, perhaps in court.

The High Court rejected Plentyoffish’s argument under section 5(4)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, on the basis that Plentyoffish had no goodwill in the UK at the time when the application was made and had not shown that any UK residents had become members of its website. As it had no UK customers, the registration of the trade mark in the UK did not constitute passing off. There was a difference between having a reputation and acquiring goodwill. It may be that people in the UK knew of Plentyoffish because UK users had visited the site and so it had a reputation; however, goodwill required it to have customers, which was not the case here. Customers would mean that they actually received the goods or services (whether or not it was provided for free).

It may not be much consolation for the loser, but at least there are plenty more fish in the sea.

The initial ruling was given in favour of the film studios (whose copyright material had been copied) under section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (the Act), which provides that an injunction may be granted against an Internet service provider (ISP) that has “actual knowledge” of the use of its service to infringe copyright. The case will be of interest to ISPs and rights-holders, particularly since this is believed to be the first time that an order under section 97A has been made against an ISP.

BT has been ordered to use its Cleanfeed filtering system, which is currently used to block access to websites featuring images of child abuse, to block the website. Controversially, BT was also told to pay for the cost of implementing the court order. The judge said that since BT made money out of its users, it was right that it should foot the bill as part of the cost of doing business, and in any event the costs were proportionate. It left open the possibility of whether the costs would always be paid for by the ISP but in this case it would make sense.

BT and the film studios agreed that as software had been developed and was likely to be circulated by copyright infringers that could circumvent BT’s Cleanfeed system, BT’s blocking measures may have limited effect. However, the High Court judge said that the court order would still be justified if it meant that access to Newzbin 2 was prevented for only a minority of users.

This is the first time an order has been granted against an ISP under section 97A of the Act, but it is also interesting to note that the judge stated that he thought it unlikely that, following the implementation of the block, a BT user would be able to bring a claim against BT for breach of their Internet service contract with the ISP. However, that might be little consolation for BT, which merely thanked the High Court for providing ‘clarity’ on the issue.

No doubt, BT would have felt a bit aggrieved that the Court had refused to accept its argument that the order should be set aside or varied if the film studios did not apply within a reasonable time for the same injunction against other UK ISPs. The Court said that there was nothing in the law that made the injunction conditional on this action being taken. It was for the studios to decide on which remedies they would pursue and against whom.

BT would also no doubt have been unhappy at the refusal of the judge to give it permission to shut down Cleanfeed temporarily if it needed to. The judge said that it would only do that if the studios consented or BT obtained a court order.

So, all in all, a great result for the creative industries, but not a particularly good day in court for innocent ISPs.

The 65 requests received in that period covered more than 300 individual items, and came from the UK government and courts. Six of the requests related to videos that raised national security concerns on YouTube, and several other were court orders relating to defamation and privacy.

Details of the requests can be found here.

The ISPs have now been granted permission to appeal by the Court of Appeal. It seemed that the Digital Economy Act was safe following the Court of Appeal’s initial decision to refuse permission to appeal, but this long-running saga now seems to have some more time left to run.

The complaint was that the website had been misleading as it had not set out that the surcharges were not optional in order to make a purchase from the website. It was also argued that the website was misleading in the way it set out VAT on purchases, as the price quoted was with the figure excluding of VAT, whereas in all cases VAT would apply.

The ASA upheld both parts of the complaint, ruling that there had been a breach of the CAP Code in terms of misleading advertising and pricing. The CAP Code is the code of practice aimed at ensuring adverts, including material written on businesses’ own websites and social networking websites, are fair and not misleading. The ASA is a regulator in charge of enforcing the CAP Code.

This issue is increasingly in the public eye. The Office of Fair Trading recently told travel companies to make credit and debit card surcharges clearer on their websites. In addition, the Consumer Rights Directive recently adopted by the European Union requires pricing to be more clearly set out.

Many people may be under the misapprehension that they have until the Consumer Rights Directive is brought into force under English law (likely to be about two years from now) before they have to make all charges clear up front in an online order process. In fact, as this ruling shows, failure to be up front and clear on pricing is already a breach of the CAP Code and the ASA enforces the CAP Code even for something said on an organisation’s own website. Although a breach of the Code does not have legal effect, it can result in bad publicity and an inability to obtain advertising space in the future.

The first report considered how 14 social networking websites had implemented the 2009 agreement. This second report considered nine social networking websites, which included a range of blogging, gaming, file-sharing and personal social-networking functionality, and found that only two of the websites had default settings which made a child’s information visible only to approved contacts; the other websites shared a large amount of that information beyond a child’s approved contacts.

The EC has said that it will take into account the two reports when it undertakes a comprehensive initiative to empower and protect children when using new technologies, which is set to take place later this year.

The ECJ has ruled that:

-       national legislation that restricts the sale or use of foreign decoder cards is in breach of Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“Treaty”) and it infringes the freedom to provide services; and

-       exclusive licence agreements that restrict the supply of decoder cards to TV viewers who want to watch those broadcasts outside of the Member State for which the licence is granted are in breach of Article 101 of the Treaty, which prohibits agreements that have as their object or effect the distortion of trade between Member States.

The ECJ ruled that a breach of Article 56 cannot be justified either by the intention to protect the intellectual property rights in the broadcasts or in an attempt to encourage more people to actually attend the football matches being broadcast.

The ECH also considered Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive, which allows copyright owners to restrict any “communication to the public” of their works. The ECJ ruled that the transmission in a pub of broadcasts containing copyright protected works – in this case the opening video sequence of Premier League matches that contains the Premier League anthem – is a “communication to the public” under the Copyright Directive, and the consent of the copyright owner is required for such a communication.

The ECJ’s ruling is largely in line with the opinion of Juliane Kokott, one of the eight Advocates General to the ECJ whose opinions, whilst not binding, are usually followed in the ECJ’s ruling. It remains to be seen how the High Court applies the ECJ’s ruling to the facts of the case of Karen Murphy and other similar cases before it. It would seem that pubs cannot be prevented from obtaining foreign decoders to show Premier League matches shown by foreign broadcasters.

However, the part of the ruling relating to the Premier League’s anthem and opening video sequence may take the edge off the ruling for rights holders. It would seem that, if the Premier League can continue to include certain copyrighted content in the broadcasts, such as its anthem and opening sequence, commercial institutions such as pubs will not be able to show broadcasts from foreign broadcasters without the consent of the Premier League. However, this seems unlikely to impact on an individual’s rights under the ruling, who may be able to show such copyrighted material in their own homes as it would not then be a “communication to the public”.

Others have argued that the Premier League will find it hard to protect this copyright and enforce its rights against commercial venues if the High court agrees with this interpretation. Still, we may yet see increased amounts of copyrighted content in each Premier League broadcast which would further prevent commercial venues showing the broadcasts, and attempts by commercial venues to split the copyrighted content from the match itself, which the ECJ confirmed is not the copyright of the Premier League as it cannot be considered the Premier League’s own “intellectual creation”.

The ECJ’s ruling seems to have implications on how the Premier League, and possibly other rights holders in relation to films and music, sell their rights within the European Union. The ruling may result in a single EU-wide market for rights as the Premier League tries to mitigate the effect of the ruling; this would avoid the domestic price being undercut from overseas. This may impact on domestic broadcasters, such as Sky, who would then need to buy the rights on an EU-wide basis rather than domestically. But at least it would protect the value of their investment.

Interflora, a flower delivery network, operated under CTM and UK-registered trade marks of “INTERFLORA”. Marks & Spencer sold products online, including flowers. Marks & Spencer bought a number of keywords containing the word “INTERFLORA”, and other variations, on Google AdWords – a service provided by the search engine operator Google, where specific adverts appear against certain search terms. When users searched for “INTERFLORA”, a link to Marks & Spencer’s online flower delivery network appeared. Interflora issued proceedings in the High Court against Marks & Spencer for infringement of the Trade Marks Directive.

The High Court adjourned proceedings and referred a number of questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). These questions covered what constituted “use” of a registered trade mark by a competitor, what goods and services were considered “identical” for the purposes of the Trade Marks Directive and the Community Trade Mark Regulation, whether such use might lead a consumer to believe the trade mark owner and competitor are part of the same commercial network, and whether Google’s lack of restriction on the use of the trade mark by the competitor affected the application of the Trade Marks Director and the Community Trade Mark Regulation.

The ECJ has now ruled that:

-      A trade mark owner can prevent competitors using the registered mark as a keyword for goods and services identical with those covered by the registration if that use might adversely affect one of the functions of the mark. The ECJ identified three functions. In terms of the original function, use of the registered mark will have an adverse affect on the trade mark’s function of indicating origin if the keyword does not enable a reasonably well-informed and observant Internet user to recognise the identity of the service provider as against the trade mark owner’s identity. As regards the advertising function, the ECJ said that use of the keyword by a third party would not be relevant, even if it caused the trade mark owner to have to spend more advertising money in enhancing its exposure in response to search requests for the trade mark term. The third function was the investment function, which allowed trade mark owners to acquire and preserve a reputation to attract consumers and retain their loyalty; the ECJ ruled that the mere fact that a keyword leads consumers to switch to a competitor does not mean that the investment function is adversely affected.

-      A trade mark owner that has a particular reputation can prevent competitors using the registered mark as a keyword if such use takes unfair advantage of the character or reputation of the mark (known as “free-riding”) or causes detriment to the character (“dilution”) or reputation (“tarnishment”) of the mark. Use of the registered mark as a keyword cannot be prevented by the owner where the advertising offers an alternative to the owner’s goods or services, provided that the alternative is not an imitation of the owner’s goods or services, does not cause dilution or tarnishment and does not adversely affect the functions of the trade mark.

The ECJ’s ruling has added little to the existing jurisprudence. However, one aspect of the ruling might offer new hope to those seeking to prove infringement – the ECJ ruled that a “substantial interference” with the “investment function” of a trade mark (which is seen as the purpose of acquiring and preserving a commercial reputation) is an infringement of that trade mark.

The proceedings will now move back to the High Court for judgment, and it will not be until that judgment is issued that the full effect of the ECJ’s ruling will be seen. The “investment function” aspect may give Interflora an additional argument when the proceedings come back before High Court. However, it seems that the national courts will have to consider the ECJ’s ruling on a case by case basis based on the facts. In addition, given how widespread the use of keywords has become, it may become harder for a trade mark owner to argue that infringement has taken place through use of keywords – most Internet users are aware of the process and know what product they are looking for when they perform a search.

We await the ruling of the High Court to pollenate our thoughts…

The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) claimed that Purely Creative, which promoted various prize-draw scratch-cards breached the Regulations because consumers ended up paying a significant contribution towards the value of the prize in premium-rate telephone charges and costs of delivery and insurance. The OFT failed to obtain Purely Creative’s agreement to various undertakings relating to the promotions and applied for an injunction under the Enterprise Act 2002 which would prevent Purely Creative from continuing with the promotions. The High Court initially ruled that the promotions breached the Regulations and injunctions should be granted in principle. However, the High Court accepted undertakings from Purely Creative in lieu of injunctions, by which Purely Creative undertook, amongst other things, not to have any future promotions which created the false impression that a consumer had won or might win a prize where any effort made by the consumer in claiming that prize is subject to the consumer incurring a cost which would then cover either the cost of the prize or Purely Creative’s delivery and insurance costs.

Purely Creative appealed the ruling of the High Court. The OFT cross appealed with amended suggested undertakings and argued that, if those suggested undertakings could not be approved by the Court of Appeal, the interpretation of paragraph 31 of schedule 1 of the Regulations should be referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for clarity.

The Court of Appeal stayed both the appeal and cross-appeal and referred a number of questions to the ECJ:

-          do the Regulations prohibit consumers from incurring any cost when claiming a prize?

-          if Purely Creative offers a number of methods of claiming a prize but only one of them incurs any cost (even a small cost), is that a breach of the Regulations?

-          if Purely Creative was allowed to run promotions where consumers incurred only a small cost in claiming a prize, how should a court decide whether that cost is sufficiently small, and should the court also consider whether such costs, even though small, are necessary?

-          does the use of the words “false impression” in paragraph 31 of the Regulations impose an additional consideration on courts on top of the consideration of whether a consumer can pay to receive a prize, and, if so, what is a “false impression” and how is it created?

The reference will hopefully provide some clarity in the interpretation of the Regulations. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal ruled that the undertakings given to the High Court remain in full force and effect until the ECJ decision is passed down.

The Government commissioned Ofcom to produce a report on how effectively the website-blocking provisions of the DEA could be enforced. The report considered:

-          the technical means available of blocking websites, which it concluded could not be 100% effective and could be widely avoided; and

-          how effective the DEA could be when compared to section 97A of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), under which an ISP’s actual knowledge of copyright infringement using its network could be grounds for the granting of an injunction by the courts. The report concluded that the DEA method would be slow, expensive and uncertain when compared to the CDPA route.

The Ofcom report concludes that any DEA system would be ineffective, and that website blocking should be only one of a number of alternatives to reducing copyright infringement online. The Government’s announcement follows a recent case considered by the High Court in which BT was ordered to block a copyright infringing website known as Newzbin 2 under the provisions of section 97A of the CDPA. Following the ruling, some questioned whether the relevant sections of the DEA are actually necessary – the courts seem capable of dealing with the issue of blocking on a case-by-case basis under the CDPA.

Whilst the section 97A method can also be long and expensive, the Newzbin ruling shows that the method is a realistic option. When compared with the DEA, its requirements are also much easier to understand and invoke – the CDPA requires the demonstration of actual knowledge on the part of an ISP that its network is being used for copyright infringing activities. The DEA, on the other hand, has a number of requirements, including having evidence of the amount and type of material available, as well as the need to show that, before a website can be blocked, the operator of the website as well as the ISP has been warned of the possible consequences of the infringing activity.

ITV Broadcasting, together with Channel 4 Television and other broadcasters, issued proceedings against TVC for infringement of copyright. The case came to trial with the broadcasters arguing that the copyright in the broadcasts and films was infringed by (i) TVC communicating them to the public, and (ii) TVC making transient copies of the broadcasts and films in its own servers and on the screens of its users.

TVC based its defence on the following arguments:

(a)                 section 20 (1)(c) of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) states that communicating a copyright work to the public by broadcast constitutes infringement of copyright, but this section went beyond the powers of the Secretary of State granted to it under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 (which grants powers for the implementation of European law in the UK) and the scope of the Copyright Directive, making section 20 (1)(c) “ultra vires” and therefore invalid;

(b)                 even if section 20 (1)(c) was validly enacted, TVC was not communicating the broadcasts and films within the meaning of that section and thus not infringing copyright;

(c)                 any copies of the broadcasts and films made on TVC’s servers were not copies of substantial parts, and therefore copyright was not infringed;

(d)                 TVC had a defence under section 28A of the CDPA in that it was making temporary incidental copies as an integral part of a technological process to allow it to transmit the work between third parties, and that, in doing so, the transmission had no independent economic significance to TVC; and

(e)                 TVC had a defence under section 73 of the CDPA in that it was streaming regional channels only in the area for which those channels were made for reception and the re-transmission was re-transmitted through the Internet by cable from its servers.

The Ruling

The High Court ruled as follows:

(a)                 section 20 (1)(c) of the CDPA was not “ultra vires” – the powers of the Secretary of State under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 were not to be interpreted narrowly and allowed for legislation to be enacted by the UK Government which was not specifically required for the implementation of an EU Directive such as the Copyright Directive. Rather, section 20 (1)(c) was closely related to the Copyright Directive’s subject matter and was thus validly enacted;

(b)                 TVC was, in the view of the High Court, communicating films and broadcasts to the public, but this issue was referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. This was because case law reviewed by the High Court did not deal with the specific issue considered in this case – whether or not there was a communication to the public when an intermediary entity, acting for its own profit, intervened in full knowledge of the consequence of its actions and in order to expand its own audience to its transmissions and adverts, and communicated broadcast signals to the public who could access that signal using their own television or computer at home;

(c)                 TVC was not, in the view of the High Court, reproducing a substantial part of the films or broadcasts in its servers or on a user’s screen, but this issue was also referred to the ECJ. This was because the meaning of ‘reproduction in part’ (whether individual frames amounted to a substantial part of the copyright work and whether the display of a broadcast on screen amounted to reproduction) had already been referred to the ECJ in another case – Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure – and the ECJ’s decision in that case was outstanding;

(d)                 TVC did not need the protection of section 28A of the CDPA if the High Court’s view in (iii) above was correct, as no defence would be needed if there was no reproduction of broadcasts; however, the High Court noted that this issue depended on the ECJ’s decision in the Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure case; and

(e)                 the High Court ruled that the defence under section 73 of the CDPA did apply to the channels streamed by TVC but only where (a) there was actually a cable involved in the re-transmission at the user’s end i.e. the streaming to a computer was covered by the defence, but not streaming to a mobile phone, and (b) the re-transmission was within the intended regional area for service of that channel.

Comment

Copyright seems to be a major issue in the courts at the moment, and the decision of the ECJ in relation to those issues referred, both in this case and the Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure case will have a huge impact on the streaming of broadcasts on the Internet. The High Court’s view seemed to be that the streaming for commercial purposes was an infringement of broadcast copyright, but it remains to be seen whether the ECJ’s decision differs fro the High Court’s initial view.

Andrew Ainsworth (AA) was hired in 1976 by Lucasfilm (L) to make ‘Stormtrooper’ helmets and armour for the film ‘Star Wars’ which was released in 1977 (later renamed ‘Star Wars: A New Hope’). In 2004, AA set up a website and sold helmets and armour produced using the same mould as had been used in 1976, some of which were sold and delivered to customers in the USA. L issued proceedings against AA in California for infringement of copyright and trade marks, and the US District Court in California ruled against AA to the tune of $10 million. However, since AA had no assets in the USA against which the judgement could be enforced and since the UK usually does not enforce US court judgements, the US proceedings were not taken any further.

Instead, proceedings were issued in England. AA admitted that he had used drawings provided to him in 1976 by L, and that he had used those drawings in producing the helmet and armour. Although AA admitted that L had had unregistered design rights in the helmets and armour which would have prohibited him from manufacturing identical objects (and such rights are totally different to copyright), he contended that these were the only rights L had had which AA could have otherwise infringed (as these unregistered design rights only last for 10-15 years from their creation and so had expired at the time he started recreating the helmets and armour). However, he said that to the extent the drawings and objects attracted protection under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), they were not artistic works (and it should be noted that a sculpture is an Artistic work so he was arguing the objects were not sculptures, which would attract protection). He also argued that he was not infringing CDPA by making helmets and armour to the designs because, if for some reason the judges were to find that the original objects were sculptures (contrary to what he was arguing) then he was entitled to a defence under sections 51 and 52 of the CDPA which permits manufacture of an article to a design, without infringing copyright.

In the initial ruling, the High Court ruled that the defence under sections 51 and 52 of the CDPA did apply. Accordingly, there was no copyright infringement. The High Court also ruled that, whilst the US judgment could not be enforced in the English courts, the US copyright had been infringed and the claim was justicable in the English courts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling of the High Court by saying that the helmet and armour were not artistic works under the CDPA. However, the Court of Appeal rejected the High Court’s reasoning in relation to the justicability of a claim in the English courts – a claim for infringement of US copyright should not be justicable in the English courts. As a result, L appealed to the Supreme Court on two issues:

1)       whether the helmets and amour were sculptures (which would attract copyright protection) and then whether the defences under sections 51 and 52 of the CDPA applied; and

2)       whether the English courts could consider a claim against a person domiciled in England for copyright infringement alleged to have happened, and was subject to a law, outside the EU.

Supreme Court Ruling

1) Copyright

The law relevant to the copyright infringement claim, as referred to above, is provided by the CDPA. Under section 1 of the CDPA, copyright exists in original artistic works. Under section 4 of the CDPA, artistic works can include graphic works or sculptures, which are defined as a cast or model made for the purposes of sculpture. Section 16 of the CDPA defines copyright infringement as being a person who copies all or part of a work, whether directly or indirectly, without the copyright owner’s permission.

The Supreme Court ruled that the helmet was not a sculpture. Rather, it was considered to be ‘a mixture of costume and prop’ for the effect of the film it was used in. The film itself was the work of art, rather than the helmet, which merely contributed to the success of the film. The Supreme Court referred to the helmet as ‘utilitarian’ in that it was merely an element of the production process of the film. Therefore the rulings of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal were upheld.

As such, the Supreme Court did not need to consider sections 51 and 52 of the CDPA and whether AA could rely on them as defences to the copyright infringement – the helmet was not an artistic work that was subject to copyright in the first place, and as such AA had not infringed any copyright under the CDPA for which he required a defence.

2) Justicability in England

The relevant law considered by the Supreme Court, in order to decide whether alleged copyright infringement abroad under the provisions of a foreign law was justicable in the English courts, was somewhat more complicated, in that the Supreme Court had to consider both the Brussels Regulation, an EU regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and case law.

Under article 22(4) of the Brussels Regulation 2000, an exception is provided to the general rule that a defendant should be sued in the court where the defendant is domiciled. That exception is that, where proceedings relate to the registration or infringement of intellectual property rights, exclusive jurisdiction is given to the member state in which registration has taken place, been applied for or should have taken place. This exception takes effect irrespective of the domicile of the defendant.

The case law considered by the Supreme Court was extensive, and below is a brief summary only of the issues from the cases considered:

-          the Moçambique rule, resulting from a case in 1893, relates to the trespass of property, and states that the English courts will not exercise jurisdiction in relation to matters which were ‘local’ in their nature, compared to proceedings which were ‘transitory or personal’. Therefore the English courts would not accept jurisdiction on a claim over property outside of English territory unless it could be proved that the matter was a ‘transitory or personal’ rather than a ‘local’ issue;

-          the rule in Philips v Eyre 1870, which states that an act done abroad can only be the subject of proceedings in England if the act, if done in England, would have been a tort;

-          Tyburn Productions v Conan Doyle 1991, in which an infringement of US copyright was struck out by applying the Moçambique rule and the rule in Philips v Eyre;

-          Coin Controls v Suzo International 1999, which applied the Moçambique rule and the rule in Philips v Eyre as well as article 22 of the Brussels Regulation; and

-          Red Sea Insurance v Bouygues 1995, a Privy Council ruling which was applied by the Court of Appeal in Pearce v Ove 2000 in relation to hearing a claim for infringement of Dutch copyright, which stated that the rule in Philips v Eyre should be displaced if a country had a specific relationship to a particular act and the parties.

The Supreme Court ruled that the claim for infringement of US copyright was a claim over which the English courts could accept jurisdiction if there was a basis for that jurisdiction in relation to the defendant. The Supreme Court ruled that the Moçambique rule and the rule in Philips v Eyre were no longer relevant, having been pushed to the side by Red Sea Insurance v Bouygues 1995 and actually being abolished by the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. As such, there was nothing to prevent the English courts accepting jurisdiction over infringement of intellectual property rights abroad – L’s claim against AA for copyright infringement in the USA under US law could be heard in the English courts.

The Supreme Court also considered intellectual property policies relating to this issue, and referred to the fact that article 22(4) of the Brussels Regulation, which assigned exclusive jurisdiction to courts of the country where intellectual property rights originated (which would have prevented the English courts from accepting jurisdiction in this case) would apply to copyright only in rare cases. The Supreme Court made clear that article 22(4) does not apply to intellectual property outside the EU, but emphasised that it shows that there is a distinction between claims which involve registration or validity of intellectual property rights and those which do not, reiterating that this claim was for copyright infringement and not validity or registration issues.

The Supreme Court also considered Rome (II), the EU regulation on non-contractual obligations, which, whilst not applicable in this case as it came into force in 2009, shows that European policy is not against the litigation of foreign intellectual property rights. Rather, the Supreme Court stated that Rome (II) “… plainly envisages that actions may be brought in [EU members states] for infringement of foreign intellectual property rights, including copyright”.

As such, The Supreme Court ruled that the decision in Tyburn Productions v Conan Doyle was mistaken, and that the English courts could accept jurisdiction for the claim by L for breach of copyright by AA in the USA.

Comment

The importance of this ruling should not be underestimated. Many view this as a victory for Mr Ainsworth because he cannot be sued for his sales in the UK (because the original helmets and armour are not sculptures) and because he will not be sued in the UK for his sales in the US – even though he now could be sued (and the only reason Lucasfilm will not sue him is because his sales in the US were so low, he’s not worth suing)! But that is the narrow view of this case.

The wider significant issue ruled on by the Supreme Court is jurisdiction, and this is what affects everyone else in the future. The fact that a claim for foreign copyright infringement against a person domiciled in England falls within the jurisdiction of the English courts has wide-ranging implications.

Big Brother Watch’s statement can be found here: http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/Police_databases.pdf.

These figures are astonishing. Everyone would reasonably expect there to be the odd bad apple or two. But the scale of wrongdoing is incredible. The police need to carry out a root and branch review to ensure that their staff more effectively do what they should be doing – protecting the public. Anyone arguing that this demonstrates that we live in a police state, however, need to remember this – we only found out about these figures because of the Freedom of Information Act and the investigative work carried out by Big Brother Watch.

The ECJ ruled that Viking was not prevented from offering the refill service by Kosan’s trade marks on the bottles due to the fact that:

• it was industry standard to offer refills of such bottles, regardless of their shape; and
• the bottles were expensive (compared to the gas that would go inside them), had independent economic value and were designed for re-use.

As such, the ECJ ruled that it was unlikely that a consumer might assume a connection between Kosan and Viking, especially as Kosan’s bottle labelling remained intact and Viking had sticky labels to refer to its gas. The ECJ further ruled that a consumer would be unfairly restricted if, having bought the bottle, they could only have it refilled by one supplier, as the bottle had certain advantageous technical characteristics.

Simon Weinberg, solicitor in the Commercial/IP/IT team at Matthew Arnold & Baldwin LLP and assistant editor of Upload-IT, comments, “This case is interesting as it shows a situation where the industry standard was for the bottles to be refilled, avoiding any contention that a consumer may assume a connection between the supplier and the refiller. This contrasts with another recent case in the High Court in which cage containers for bottles could not be refilled with different bottles due to the confusion it might cause a consumer in thinking that both the bottles and the caged container came from the same source. Although the rulings come from different courts, the contrast clearly shows the importance of industry standards in trade mark rulings.”

Newzbin has now threatened to break BT’s Cleanfeed filtering system if BT attempts to block the site. BT has hit back and said that it would be appalled if that happened as Cleanfeed helped protect innocent from highly offensive and illegal content such as child pornography.

Last year, Apple filed proceedings against HTC for the infringement of 20 patents, but HTC counterclaimed, accusing Apple of patent infringement, and attempted to have the sale of iPhones, iPads and iPods banned in the USA.

Meanwhile, Apple and Samsung are in a spat, accusing each other of copying each other’s technology.

Delta replaced Shütz’s bottles with new bottles produced by different manufacturers and sold the containers on. Delta included various disclaimers on the containers once the bottles had been replaced relating to the bottles themselves, but Shütz issued proceedings for infringement of trade marks and passing off.

The High Court ruled that passing off had been established, and that the replacement of bottles by the defendant infringed the claimant’s trade marks, both in relation to the bottles and the container as a whole, as an end user would see the Shütz name on the cage and presume that the bottles were also manufactured by Shütz. The High Court rejected Delta’s argument that the relevant consumers were the bottle fillers rather than the end users. The High Court considered that the disclaimers included on the containers by Delta were not sufficient to inform an end user that only the cage was from Shütz as they were not positioned prominently, were worded ambiguously and could come off as they were not well attached.

The High Court ruled in favour of the claimant under section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, as the marks and services were similar and there was a likelihood that the average consumer would be confused or make a connection between the claimant’s website and the defendant’s business. The High Court rejected a claim for trade mark infringement under section 10(1) – which protects trade mark owners against identical marks for identical services. The telephone recordings did not show that Client Connection had no real prospect of success of showing that it was using a different name, but in any event the services were not identical. The High Court added that, if a claim under section 10(2) had failed, the ruling would have been in favour of the claimant under section 10(3) as the claimant’s business of cold-calling under its trading name might tarnish the claimant’s reputation whilst using the claimant’s reputation for its benefit.

The defendant had issued a counter-claim that the trade marks lacked distinctiveness and were too descriptive and were thus invalid, but the High Court rejected the counter-claim on the grounds that the trade mark was highly distinctive due to its use over a number of years.

The BSA recently received an anonymous tip-off that a York-based company was using unlicensed software and, after reaching an agreement with the company, handed them a £29,000 bill to cover licences and costs. The BSA has previously targeted Birmingham and now plans to audit 1,500 companies in Yorkshire. The BSA estimates that it received fines and fees of £2.2 million in the UK in 2010.

The parties have each interpreted the ruling differently. IPCom hopes to have 3G Nokia phones banned from the UK unless Nokia agrees to enter a licensing agreement and pay licensing fees relating to the patent. However, whilst the High Court did not specify which Nokia phones infringed the patent, the ruling did refer to phones using alternative software to the patent. Nokia argues that its current 3G phone offerings all use this alternative software, and that any infringement occurred only in older versions –as such, Nokia believes that no ban or injunction preventing the sale of those products in the UK can take place.

The ban might not make it through to the next round as other Member States of the EU have argued that the ban is in breach of EU competition law, and the law is set to be reviewed by the European Commission before it comes into force. Several trade bodies, including the European Gaming and Betting Association, have also criticised the law.

CCTV images can be considered as personal data, and the ICO’s action came after CCTV footage of a shopper from the website was posted on YouTube. The ICO has made it clear that such disclosure of personal data should take place only where ‘necessary’ i.e. for the purposes of crime detection, rather than just for entertainment, as it was here.

The ICO criticised Internet Eyes for not encrypting CCTV images it shared with its members, and it was also not tracking member activity meaning that it could not trace who had posted the video on YouTube. The ICO has made sure that the website has signed an undertaking to ensure encryption and sufficient tracking, and has also requested that the website not allow a member to access CCTV footage taken within a 30 mile radius of the member’s registered location, in an attempt to decrease the likelihood that those people visible in the footage are identifiable to a particular member.

In this case, the High Court had to consider a scheme of arrangement involving financial assistance as part of a restructuring to resolve financial difficulties suffered within a group of companies, and ruled that, whilst some aspects of the scheme of arrangement could be defined as financial assistance under section 678(1) of the CA, they also fell within the principle purpose exception under section 678(2) of the CA. The principle purpose was considered by the High Court to be the attempt to release a subsidiary’s pension scheme liability, with any payments and loans made in good faith and in the interests of the companies involved. The High Court also ruled that the payment of costs and giving of indemnities as part of the scheme of arrangement, which would otherwise be construed as financial assistance, should be approved by the exercise of the High Court’s power under section 681(2)(e) of the CA, as such payments and indemnities were commercially necessary for the restructuring and in the interests of the companies’ creditors and members.

The High Court also ruled that an error in a figure contained in a special resolution, which was being voted on by the company’s members to approve changes in share capital under the scheme of arrangement, could be construed so as to correct that error. Under the CA, a resolution to be passed at a general meeting cannot be considered a special resolution unless the text of the resolution was contained in the notice of general meeting. The courts have previously held that a general meeting cannot amend a special resolution except to correct grammar or spelling, or where all members eligible to vote on the resolution waive their rights to notice. However, in this instance, it was clear that the special resolution, when read with accompanying documentation, contained an error, and the High Court ruled that common sense should prevail – that the special resolution could be read as a matter of construction as if the error had not been made. In addition, the meeting had been informed of the error prior to the vote, and the minutes of the meeting noted the error.

This ruling is important as it is a further insight into how the revamped financial assistance doctrine under the CA is interpreted by the courts. It is also a good to see that the courts are willing to be flexible when considering a special resolution containing an error, allowing that error to be considered corrected – however, it would be interesting to see the court’s ruling if an error contained in a special resolution was a mistaken word rather than a mistaken figure. In this case it was obvious to all that the figure was incorrect, but if mistaken wording was included in the special resolution the mistake might not be so clear-cut and the court not so generous in their ruling.

It is an offence under the Data Protection Act to knowingly or recklessly obtain personal data without consent. The data was important to T-Mobile and its competitors as it contained details of names, addresses, telephone numbers and customer contract end dates. This is the first time the Information Commissioner has sought a confiscation order under the Proceeds of Crime Act. That is where an order is made to deprive the wrong-doer from any benefit he has received from the crime.

The Information Commissioner has hailed the result in this case as marking a new chapter in deterrents against misuse of personal data. This case proves that there will be an audit trail and his office will try to find what has happened to it, and will take appropriate action, according to the Commissioner. The fine is the largest ever for employees who have stolen personal data for their own gain.

This case shows that some people in the personal injury industry are taking “ambulance chasing” to another level. It is one thing to take part in activity that may leave a bad taste in the mouth.  It is another to break the law when doing so.

The claim for contempt was brought by the woman with whom Goodwin was alleged to have had an affair. ANL had published a pixellated photograph of the woman in The Daily Mail, and she claimed that, together with the information contained in the accompanying article, she could be identified, which was in breach of the anonymity order previously made by the High Court. The article also contained a number of statements relating to the applicant that were alleged to be false. The applicant claimed that the article and picture clearly broke the terms of the anonymity order granted to protect her.

The High Court ruled that the effect of the false information was that it might lead the public to believe that disclosing the identity of the applicant would be in the public interest. However, the High Court stated that it did not believe that a referral to the Attorney General would actually assist the Attorney General. The High Court did not refer the case to the Attorney General, but added that the applicant was free to make the referral herself.

In this case, the owner and licensee of the CTM for the word ‘STUNNING’ in relation to perfumes issued proceedings for trade mark infringement arising out of unauthorised use of the mark, and the High Court had to consider the CTM Regulation. The CTM Regulation states that CTM assignments have to be in writing, but does not specify any formalities in relation to CTM licences.

The High Court ruled that, if the owner provided its consent, the licensee could bring proceedings for infringement. The High Court also ruled that, in this case, an infringement of the CTM had taken place. The position in respect of the EU-wide CTM contrasts with what happens when a UK-only registered trade mark is infringed – in that case, the licence has to be in writing before a licensee can take action.

The technology automatically recognises users in photographs where a person in the photograph has been ‘tagged’ and then applies the technology to other photographs to automatically suggest a name to tag the person in the photograph, but without the subject’s consent. The technology has been switched on but as far as the user’s privacy settings are concerned, this has been done on an ‘opt-out’ rather than ‘opt-in’ basis.

The concern stems from the fact that Facebook has not told users how the information collected by the technology will be used nor obtained prior consent, and the fact that privacy settings are not as clear as they might be. The use has been criticised by the European Union’s Article 29 Working Party, which represents the ICO and its counterparts across the EU. The ICO has suggested that users should be given more information about the technology and the ability to refuse consent to its use in relation to their profile.

The website is effectively a search engine which will list approved retailers for a particular brand. TSI have been keen to point out that the website is not a one-stop-shop, as some legitimate retailers may not be on the list. However, the website is likely to help divert consumers away from rogue retailers in an attempt to bring down the number of counterfeit goods on the market – 5 million counterfeit items were seized by the UK Border Agency in 2010.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the contract set out the only circumstances in which a party could be excluded from a right to rescind, and the developer had breached another provision of the contract which did not exclude that right. As such, if a contract expressly qualifies a right to rescind, any other breach of the contract will not preclude that right, thereby making the rule that a party may not rely on their own breach (which has been reiterated in recent case law) irrelevant in such a case.

The Court of Appeal also considered whether the developer had waived the right to rescind by electing to affirm the contract. The Court of Appeal ruled that such decisions had to be made on a case by case basis but that, in this case, the developer was entitled to wait after the date for fulfilling the conditions had passed before serving notice to rescind, and in the meantime was entitled to continue to progress in other areas relating to the contract without waiving its right. It is important to note that the continued performance of a contract does not always mean that a party has waived its right. However, these areas must be handled very carefully and specialist legal advice sought to ensure that a contractual right is not deemed to have been waived.

• Creation of a Digital Copyright Exchange. This would be a centralised digital copyright works marketplace where licences to copyright content could be readily bought and sold, akin to a copyright shop. This would extend what currently happens with through music collections agencies such as PRS. The aim is to have this implemented by the end of 2012. In addition, the UK should support the European Commission’s proposals to establish a framework for cross-border licensing.
• Introduction of legislation to permit use of orphan works – copyright works where the rights owner has not been ascertained. The European Commission has also come up with similar plans recently.
• Allowing wider exceptions for lawful copying, such as to include format shifting between a laptop and mp3 player, which is still unlawful. This may also include copyright exceptions for non-commercial research, such as digital copying of medical journals for computerised analysis in research. Parody and library archiving would also be exceptions to copyright. The exceptions would be enshrined in law and non-excludable by contracting out by agreement between the parties. There is no place in the report for anything as extensive as the “fair use” exception along the lines that US law has, as that would not be compatible with European Union law.
• Increasing the Intellectual Property Office’s ability to give legally binding opinions on changes to intellectual property law in response to economic or technological changes.
• A careful look at the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The Government should look not just to enforcement but also education, growing legitimate markets and modernising copyright law. Other countries’ experiences should be considered when the Digital Economy Act starts to become operational in 2012.
• Try to remove patent thickets that stifle innovation. Thickets arise where there are overlapping patent claims by multiple applicants, resulting in delays and extra costs in innovation. This should involve cutting backlogs in patent applications. There should also be a disincentive – perhaps through cost of additional fees for patent renewals – to discourage patents that do not add much value. Computer-related patent rules also need to be clearer and stricter to avoid patents being granted for non-technical inventions or business methods.
• Investigate whether the system of protection for designs should be made clearer. The Intellectual Property Office should conduct an assessment based on evidence within the next 12 months to consider the relationship between design rights and innovation.

It now remains to be seen what the Government will do in terms of implementation of the recommendations within the report. There have been other intellectual property reviews previously – most notably the Gowers Review – which were not then followed-up significantly.

Viviane Reding was speaking in response to several recent high profile data breaches, such as that by Sony in relation to its PlayStation Network, which affected 100 millions users. She criticised the delay of seven days before users were told of the Sony breach and she said notification of data loss should be immediate.

She added that all companies, even those outside the European Union, should comply with EU data protection laws if they target users based in the EU.

The Act has been controversial ever since it was passed in early 2010, when it was rushed through Parliament so that it would become law before the General Election. BT and TalkTalk initially took action as they believed the Act did not comply with European Union Directives on e-commerce and privacy, and that it lacked proportionality. They have argued that the law would require them to restrict or suspend a customer’s Internet access even if someone else from outside that customer’s household, for whom the customer was not responsible, was using that customer’s Internet connection for file-sharing.

The High Court agreed with MMP. The franchisee was responsible for the actions of its employee. It disagreed with the franchisee’s  argument that her actions were outside of the course of her employment and were a matter for her private life. This was about an employee who had misused personal data obtained from a CV obtained through her employment.  This was a breach of her employment contract, but MMP was still responsible.

However, the franchisor’s purported termination of the contract was wrongful and that action in itself was a repudiatory breach of contract as it showed an intention not to perform the contract. The reason was that the relevant clause which had been breached said that MMP must not “do anything to adversely affect our name, Trade Marks or other Intellectual Property”.  On a true construction of those words, Antal would have needed to provide evidence that MMP’s conduct had in fact damaged the Antal brand.  It had not provided that evidence.  A mere fear or concern of the harm or reputation that would be done was not sufficient on the wording used in the agreement.

Paul Gershlick, a Partner at Matthew Arnold & Baldwin LLP and editor of Upload-IT, comments: “This case should act as a warning to businesses to be careful when selecting and managing their staff.  However, even more stark is the consequence of failing to have an agreement that says what the franchisor or other business thinks it says.  Care should be used before terminating an agreement, or the otherwise innocent party ends up being the wrongful party.  It should also have made the contract wording tighter by talking about damage to its reputation “in the franchisor’s opinion” so that it would not have to attain evidence to prove that the damage did actually occur.”

The ECHR ruled that, under the European Convention on Human Rights, the media was not obligated to give any such prior notice. The ECHR went on to say that someone’s right to privacy was protected by access to the courts to claim damages and the ability to obtain an interim injunction. In any event, if pre-notification was to be imposed on the media, the media would have to be allowed a ‘public interest’ exception which would give the media the opportunity to publish whatever they wanted provided they could support their claim that it was in the public interest. Pre-notification would have to be enforced with a fining system, in which case the media could always decide to publish a story in the belief that the benefits of publishing outweighed the impact of a fine. Therefore, the ECHR stated that even if a failure to obtain pre-clearance was an infringement of someone’s human rights (which they did not consider to be the case), any notification system would have serious pitfalls anyway which may render it practically useless.

Max Mosley has the right to appeal but it is, as yet, unclear whether he will do so. He may just have to accept that he has lost this particular race.

As part of the reforms, the ICO will also be given greater investigatory powers, under which the ICO will be able to demand information from Internet service provides (ISPs) and telecommunications companies to assist with investigations into possible breaches of the Regulations. The ICO will also be able to audit ISPs and telecommunications companies to ensure that they assist the ICO in these investigations.

Previously PP, MP and HA had all offered valet parking services in the airport forecourt. However, HA, which owns the airport, changed the arrangement so that HA was the only operator in the forecourt – other parking companies had been relocated to the airport car parks with an additional charge. It was accepted by all parties that HA had a dominant position at the airport due to its controlling position over the access to the airport’s facilities. The High Court therefore had to decide whether HA’s actions amounted to an abuse of that dominance.

The High Court ruled that HA had breached the Competition Act as its actions placed PP and MP at a competitive disadvantage due to the fact that:

• HA was left as the only valet parking supplier on the airport forecourts;
• presence on the forecourt was extremely advantageous to an operator due to the benefits it offered to customers over a car park based service;
• the car park operators would not be offering a similar product to HA so competition with HA on the forecourt was impossible; and
• there would effectively be a monopoly on the forecourts leading to risks and detriment for the consumer.

So next time you’re flying from Heathrow, it’s something to watch out for in case you think you’re being taken for a ride.

The main change implemented by the EU Directives will be in relation to the use of cookies – small text files placed in users’ browsers by websites to track their movements on the Internet. Websites will need to obtain a user’s permission before a cookie can be used. It had been hoped that it would be possible to use browser settings to meet the EU requirements, but the Government has suggested that consent through current browser settings would not be explicit enough. The Government is in discussions with browser manufacturers to see how browser settings can be enhanced to comply with the EU laws and give the explicit consent that is required.

However, the enhancements are unlikely to be active by 25 May. In the meantime, the Government has said that websites must self-regulate to ensure compliance with EU laws through easily available and recognisable icons on the website, privacy notices and clear explanations of adverts, their origins and an option to reject the cookie. The Government has not yet given prescriptive guidance as to how websites should self-regulate to comply with the new law, but that it intends to release the guidance before 25 May that will help. However, this may leave website owners with little time to understand and comply with the guidance by 25 May. Website owners should watch this space carefully, and be prepared to take urgent compliance steps to avoid enforcement action, so that they obtain users’ consent in accordance with the new laws.

Once the guidance has been released, we will be more than happy to help website owners with this compliance – please contact us for specific advice.